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AN ANALYSIS OF THE TIME SERIES OF THE IMPRISONMENT RATE IN THE
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES: A FURTHER TEST OF THE STABILITY OF
PUNISHMENT HYPOTHESIS*
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN** AND SOUMYO MOITRA***
I. INTRODUCTION
Building on Durkheim's notion' that a society
maintains a constant level of crime through a
continual readjustment of the boundaries of be-
havior that might be characterized as "deviant,"
Blumstein and Cohen 2 have hypothesized that it is
not crime that is stable, but rather the level of
punishment, and imprisonment rate per capita in
particular, that the society maintains around a
constant level. While the homeostatic level will
vary from one society to another, it is plausible
that such a steady level could exist. On the one
hand, there will always be individuals engaging in
unacceptable behavior, and if there should happen
to be too few of them, then definitions of unac-
ceptability can be revised. 3 Thus, if the amount of
criminal activity drops off, what were formerly
considered annoying but non-criminal activities
could then begin to be considered criminal. On the
other hand, if the level of activity that was cate-
gorized as criminal were to increase substantially,
a society could find itself unable or unwilling either
economically or politically to cope with that vol-
ume. It could adapt to this situation by taking a
more lenient view of activity that was previously
considered criminal but only marginally so, per-
* This study was supported by PHS Research Grant
No. I R01 MH 28437-01 from the National Institute of
Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delin-
quency. The assistance of Daniel Nagin in obtaining the
imprisonment data is much appreciated. He and Jacque-
line Cohen provided valuable comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
** Eric Jonsson Professor, School of Urban & Public
Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University; Ph.D. Cornell Uni-
versity, 1961; M.A. University of Buffalo, 1954; B. Eng.
Phys. Cornell University, 1951.
*** Research Assistant,- Urban Systems Institute,
School of Urban & Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon Uni-
versity. Ph.D. candidate, Carnegie-Mellon University;
M.S. Syracuse University, 1977; B.S. University of Sus-
sex, 1973.
'See E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL
METHOD (1964).
2 See Blumstein & Cohen, A Tieory of the Stability of
Punishment, 64J. CRIM. L. & C. 198 (1973).
3 See K. ERIKSON, THE WAYWARD PURITANS (1966).
haps by decriminalizing that behavior, or at least
by reducing the penalty.
Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 4 examined the
dynamics of the process by which this stability is
maintained, concluding that the oscillatory nature
of the time series of imprisonment rate per capita
cannot be adequately explained by a simple bal-
ancing of prison receptions and releases. Rather, a
more elaborate model which incorporates a homeo-
static shifting in the demarcation between punish-
able and non-punishable behavior is required to
explain these oscillatory patterns. As imprisonment
rates increase5 the threshold of punishable behavior
can be expected to rise. When the imprisonment
rates decline6 those thresholds can be expected to
drop.
This subtle and implicit process of societal ad-
aptation is not instantaneous. It requires several
years for the adaptation mechanisms to detect the
shifts and to accommodate them, thus giving rise
to an oscillatory process. This process was studied
in the United States, Norway, and Canada. Al-
though the process was at different levels in each
nation, it was stable in each. All three time series
were describable by a second-order autoregressive
process, with time periods of 11.2 years for the
United States, 25.4 years for Norway, and 15.7
years for Canada.
The existence of such a stable imprisonment rate
suggests that, as a nation's prison population begins
to fluctuate, pressure is generated to restore the
prison population to that stable rate. The process
of restoration would typically be through some
form of "adaptation" by the various agencies
within the nation's criminal justice system. One
form of adaptation could result in changes in the
manner in which discretion is exercised by the
various functionaries within the criminal justice
4 Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin, The Dynamics of a Homeo-
static Punishment Process, 67J. CRIM. L. & C. 317 (1977).
5 For example, this increase could be caused by de-
mographic shifts such as the aging into the imprisonment-
prone years of the cohorts of a "baby boom."
6 For example, this decline could occur as the "baby
boom" cohorts age out of the imprisonment-prone years.
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system. If prison populations get too large, police
can choose not to arrest, prosecutors can choose not
to press charges, judges can choose not to imprison,
or parole boards can choose to deny requests. This
exercise of discretion presumably would be focused
on those crimes or offenders that are the most
marginally criminal.
Similarly, if the populations drop too far below
the stable rate, then pressure would develop to
sanction certain kinds of behavior that previously
had been tolerated as more annoying than harmful.
Alternatively, the level of punishment for a given
type of offense could be increased, either by increas-
ing the "branching ratios" or probabilities of pen-
etration through the criminal justice system, espe-
cially from conviction to imprisonment, or by in-
creasing the time served in prison for a particular
offense.
To the extent that the imprisonment rate may
indeed be stable, then knowledge of that fact
should influence the debate over imprisonment
policy. Most positions in the imprisonment policy
debate focus on the amount of punishment that
should be delivered. The policy, however, is much
more appropriately viewed as a question of allo-
cating a limited capacity, defined by the stable
imprisonment rate, among alternative kinds of of-
fenses and offenders. For example, this would re-
quire those who call for greater punishment for
certain offenses to identify other offenses that
should be treated less severely in order to provide
the needed prison space.
The empirical analyses of the homeostatic hy-
pothesis in the Blumstein and Cohen study7 and in
the Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin study' were
based on aggregate rates for only three nations. To
explore the applicability of this theory to a larger
number ofjurisdictions, we examined the imprison-
ment rates of the individual states in the United
States. These jurisdictions are reasonably compa-
rable in that they share similar but distinct crimi-
nal codes and procedures, are linked together by a
common Constitution, and have similar but dis-
tinct cultural environments. The decisions made in
the individual states' criminal justice systems, how-
ever, are reasonably independent. Together, they
offer the additional opportunity to explore the
degree to which neighboring states, or states that
are similar in other ways, display similar punish-
ment patterns.
7See Blumstein & Cohen, note 2 supra.8See Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin, note 4 supra.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The basic data for this analysis were the average
daily prison population and the total population
for each state for each year from 1926 to 1974. The
data on state populations were developed by linear
interpolation between the decennial census years.
The data on prison populations were collected
from the reports of the departments of corrections
of individual states.9 These data report the number
of prisoners maintained in state institutions. They
do not include prisoners in federal institutions. The
data also exclude prisoners in local jails,10 mental
institutions, and other forms of incarceration. Vari-
ations in these other populations may be related to
the prison population, and may indeed account for
some of the fluctuations, but the presumption here
is that the state prison represents the most severe
form of punishment, short of capital punishment,
in which the state engages.
Of the fifty states, the imprisonment data from
Hawaii and Alaska could not be analyzed because
it covered an insufficient number of years. Also,
the data from Delaware had major gaps in the
reports and displayed extreme shifts which proba-
bly reflected major changes in reporting practice.
For this reason, Delaware was also excluded from
the analysis.
The remaining forty-seven states provided the
data base that was analyzed. The basic data on
prison population and total population for each
state were available for those forty-seven states. In
some cases, observations on prison population were
missing for some short intervals. In these cases, the
missing values were estimated by linear interpola-
tion between the available data points.
The analysis was conducted in two parts. First,
the hypothesis of trendlessness in the individual
states' imprisonment rates was explored, and sec-
ond, the fine structure of the imprisonment-rate
time series in the states was analyzed.
III. EXAMINATION OF TIME TRENDS THROUGH
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
We approach the issue of testing for trendlessness
by estimating the simple regression model:
Pit = at + bit
9 These data are available from the authors. Daniel
Nagin arranged for the collection of these data, and his
assistance in that regard is very much appreciated.
1o Since different states may apply different criteria in
assigning a sentenced offender to a state or local institu-
tion, it is difficult to compare the absolute levels of the
state imprisonment rates across states.
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where Pit is the prison population (Rit) divided by
the total population (Nit, in units of 100,000) of
state i(i = 1, 2, -, 47) in year t(t = 1, . -. , 49 for
the years 1926, ... , 1974). Any trends in imprison-
ment rate are represented by the estimated slopes
of the regression lines, bi. The states' mean im-
prisonment rates (Mi = rttl Pit/49), the standard
deviation (ai) of the imprisonment rates, the coef-
ficients of variation (oi/Mi), the percentage time
trend (100 gi/Mi)," and the t-statistics for the bi
provide a basis for interpreting the observed distri-
butions of the trend lines.' 2 The estimates of these
statistics are shown in Table 1. The same statistics
were also calculated for the total United States as
the aggregation of the prison population and the
total population of the forty-seven states included
in the analysis, i.e., Pus,t = J.?l, Rit/ Tl Nit.
Figure I displays the time series of the imprison-
ment rate in the United States. This series has an
average rate of 96.51 prisoners per 100,000 popu-
lation, a standard deviation of 10.56, and a coeffi-
cient of variation of 0.1 1. The time series is fairly
steady, starting with its minimum value of 76.4 in
1926, increasing in the 1930's to a maximum of
120 in 1940, declining during World War II, and
then reestablishing a fairly stable rate of about 100,
with a period of decline during the mid-1960's.
This time series is trendless, with a slope of -. 12
change in prisoners per 100,000 population per
year, or a -. 12% change per year; this trend is not
significantly different from zero statistically. This
result is consistent with the observation of trend-
lessness for total United States prison populations,
including the federal system, which was reported
in Blumstein and Cohen.1
3
Figure 2 is a scattergram of slopes of the regres-
sion lines 6i) plotted against the state means (Mi).
The distribution of means is seen to be fairly
symmetrical about the aggregate United States
mean of 96.51 per 100,000 inhabitants. The coef-
ficients of variation for the individual states' time
series lie mostly in the range of 15 to 25%, as
" This is referred to as a percentage slope. This is the
annual change in imprisonment rate as a percent of the
mean imprisonment rate.
'2 Of course, the Pit's are autocorrelated. But they are
autocorrelated because of the index parameter t. Since t
is used as the independent variable in the regression
equation, the successive observations, Pit (t = 1, . *, 49),
are otherwise independent, and in the full regression
equation, Pit = ai + bit + eit, the residuals, elf, can be
assumed to be independently normally distributed ran-
dom variables with zero mean. A normality plot test of
the residuals confirmed the validity of this assumption.
" Blumstein & Cohen, note 2 supra.
revealed in Table 1. The states with the highest
means are Nevada at 169.75, followed by Mary-
land, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, generally
southern states. The ones with the lowest means
are New Hampshire at 37.69, followed by North
Dakota, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, gener-
ally New England states. The rest appear to be
more or less clustered in the middle. The consid-
erable range in the means reflects the many cul-
tural, legal, social, and historical differences across
the states. There may also be an effect due to
different policies among the states in assigning
individuals to state prisons or to local jails, which
are not included in our data.
The distribution of the slopes is seen to be quite
asymmetric, with twenty-eight states having nega-
tive slopes that are significantly different from zero
statistically. Only six states have positive slopes,
and only three of those, South Carolina, North
Carolina, and Texas, have slopes greater than 1.0
per 100,000 per year. Even the highest positive
slope is less than 1.5, or a ratio of slope to mean of
about 2%, which is still quite small.
The distribution of the relative percentage slopes
(100 6 i/Mi) is very similar to that of the slopes
displayed in Figure 2. The principal differences
occur at the extreme values of the means and the
slopes, with the percentage slope exceeding the
slope for small values of the mean and being
smaller for the larger means. Thus, the slope of
1.45 for South Carolina becomes 2.02% of the
mean, the largest percentage slope, and the per-
centage slopes become somewhat more negative for
the states with low means. On the other hand, the
absolute slope of -2.7 for Nevada becomes - 1.59%
of its mean. The values of these percentage slopes
are displayed in Table 1.
Among the states with negative slopes, all have
slopes less than 1.5 in absolute magnitude except
Nevada at 2.7, which, probably because of its large
transient population, is an outlier in many things.
The largest group of states, twenty-four, have slopes
in the range -. 5 to +.5. All states except Nevada
fall in the range -1.5 to + 1.5, which is a reason-
ably small trend. In particular, some of the most
populous states have slopes that are either zero,
e.g., New York, California, and Pennsylvania, or
very close to zero, e.g., Ohio and Connecticut. This
influence of the large states, along with the positive
slope of Texas, generates the trendless national
mean.
In relating the trends for the individual states to
the national trendlessness, one might anticipate
that there would have been a convergence toward
[Vol. 70
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TABLE I
TIME-TREND PARAMETERS OF STATE IMPRISONMENT RATES
Standard Coefficient Percentage
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a national mean imprisonment rate by the individ-
ual states. This would have been brought about
over the period of observation by growing com-
munication among the states, by general influence
of national mass media, and by greater federal
involvement in state criminal justice policies, es-
pecially in the period of the 1960's and 1970's. This
convergence would have been observed if the states
with high imprisonment rates displayed negative
trends and the states with low imprisonment rates
displayed positive trends, i.e., if a negative associ-
ation were displayed on Figure 2. The relationship
has not been observed, as is evident from Figure 2.
This has been confirmed by a correlation analysis
(r = .000), where the slopes and means were found
to be clearly independent.
From this analysis, four groups emerge. First, the
largest group consists of twenty-eight states with
negative slopes that are generally small but signifi-
cantly less than zero statistically (with the excep-
tion of Nevada) covering the range from -. 34 to
-1.20. The second group is composed of thirteen
JVol. 70
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states without trends, i.e., with slopes not signifi-
cantly different from zero. Three states, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas, that have
comparatively high positive slopes, but still less
than 1.5 per year make up the third group. Georgia,
Arkansas, and Oregon with smaller but signifi-
cantly positive slopes are in the fourth group.
Clearly, a sizeable number of states do display a
discernible trend in imprisonment rates, but that
the trend is relatively small.
The standard deviation for the United States as
a whole is 10.56, or about one half the mean of the
individual states' standard deviations (ff = I/7
, oi = 18.7). If the states had been completely
independent in their behavior and all the states
equally populated, then the national standard de-
viation would have been 18.7/147 = 2.7. Of
course, this independence did not prevail in view
of such common factors affecting state prison pop-
ulations as national economic conditions, military
conscription, national changes in demography, cul-
ture, law, and public opinion. This interaction
among the states is most clearly reflected in high
pairwise correlations observed among the midwest-
ern states, with r about .80 to .90, as well as among
other groups of states. Most of the interstate cor-
relations are positive, but the southern states, which
had high correlations with each other, had gener-
ally weak and negative correlations with the non-
southern states.
IV. EXAMINATION OF PATrERNS THROUGH
TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS
In addition to observing the simple time trends
resulting from the regression analyses, it is desirable
to inquire further into the detailed patterns of the
time series in the individual states so as to provide
further confirmation of trends in those cases where
they do exist. It would be interesting to identify
periodicities in a state's patterns, and to examine
whether the pattern of periodicity is consistent
across similar states, and especially in neighboring
states. Such information also permits future prison
populations to be forecast with greater precision
than is possible by simple extrapolation of the time
trend.
This analysis can be performed with the Box-
Jenkins 4 method of time-series analysis. Such anal-
yses make use of the autocorrelation function,
which is defined for a time-series {zt; t = 1, 2,
N} and a lag interval k as:
14 See G. Box & G. JENKINS, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
(1970).
E[(zt - M)(Zt+k - A)]
Pk - E[(zt - t)2]E[(zt+k -A) 2]
where t = fti zt/N. This function is estimated
from the time series data by:
1l N-k "
Ak = (zt - A) (Zt+k - A
The autocorrelation function Pk thus reflects the
linkage between the value of the time series at any
time point t and the point k years later. In general,
for some k large enough, this linkage should be-
come small enough to ignore.
With the autocorrelation function, by compu-
tational procedures described by Box and Jen-
kins,16 we can determine stationariy,"i i.e., whether
the process is changing over time and the nature of
such changes, and periodicity,17 i.e., whether there
are characteristic cyclical or other periodic patterns
in the process. We can also develop forecasting
equations for estimating future values of the proc-
ess as a function of the recent past values, which
are useful for generating forecasts and also for
inferring general features of the process .from the
form of those equations.
A forecasting equation is derived by first defin-
ing the following quantities:
zt is the observed value of the time series at time
t(t -- 1,2,...,N).
B is the "backward shift operator" defined as Bzt
Szt- -I.
V is the "backwarddifference operator" defined
as Vzt = zt - zt-I = (I - B)zt.
Box and Jenkins characterize a stationary, i.e.,
steady, time series as one in which successive values
are generated by imposing a series of independent
shocks, at, on the previous values. These shocks are
assumed to be identically normally distributed
with mean zero and variance o.2. This process is
supposed to generate the process {zt} by a "linear
filter," which simply takes a weighted sum of pre-
vious shocks, so that
'1 Id
.8 Stationarity is detected by observing the successive
values of the autocorrelation function. If they die out
after a few lags, about five, then the series is considered
stationary.
17 Pericdicity is detected by observing whether the
autocorrelation, Pk, is particularly high at values of k that
are multiples of some basic period.
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Zt = !- + at + 4'iat-i + 4'2at-2 .--
= ji + Boat + PBat + P2B 2a, +
=I + (BO + iB + B 2 + .)at
- g + 4'(B)at
wherejt is the mean value of the process, and 4'(B)
is the system of weights called the "transfer func-
tion."
A special case of this process is the "autoregres-
sive model," in which the current value of the
process (zt) is expressed as a weighted linear sum
of a limited number of previous values of the
process and a shock for the current time period;
the number of such previous values necessary is the
"order" of the process. Thus, we define it = zt -
,u, the deviation from the mean value. Then, an
autoregressive process (AR) of order p is expressed
as follows:
Zit = Olit-I + t2Zt-2 + + tOpZt-p + at
or O(B)it = at.
Another kind of process is the moving average
process. In this case, it is expressed in terms of a
finite humber of previous values of at. Thus
Zt = at - Olat-i - O2 at- 2 -... Oqat-q
= O(B)at.
If q such terms are required, then the process is
described as "moving average of order q."
A time series can have features of both of these
processes, and it would be represented by an equa-
tion of the following form:
it = (P lit-I +" +' 4" t-p + at
- Oiat-i - Oqat-q
or
,(B)it = O(B)at.
In the autoregressive process, the current value
is clearly influenced by prior realizations of the
process. A larger deviation at an earlier time would
tend to persist, and so the process may be viewed
as having considerable "inertia." The moving-
average process, on the other hand, is more respon-
sive to more recent fluctuations or shocks.
In general, a series may behave in a non-station-
ary manner with no fixed mean. This would occur,
for example, if there was a time trend in the mean.
Non-stationary behavior can be represented by a
generalized autoregressive operator 4Z(B) through
the relationship.
I(B) = O(B)(I - B)d
= 4,(B)Vd
where 4,(B) is the stationary autoregressive opera-
tor. In a relationship of this form, there are no
restoring effects tending to bring zt to a mean
value. The value, d, represents the number of
repetitions of the backward difference operations
required to transform the general non-stationary
series to a stationary one. Thus, a linear time trend
would be reflected in a value of d = 1, quadratic
time trend in a value of d = 2, etc. Consequently,
the general model can be written as
O(B)Vdzt = 0(B)ak.
This general model is called the "autoregressive
integrated moving average model," or "ARIMA."
If 4p and 0 are of orders p and q respectively, it is
called an "ARIMA model of order (p, d, q)." In
the special cases, where p = 0, the series is an
"integrated moving average (IMA)"; where q =
0, the series is "integrated autoregressive (IAR)";
and if p = q = 0, then it is simply denoted as
"integrated (I)."
We will now use these concepts of time-series
analysis to discover if a series is periodic and to
estimate its period, to assess the presence of station-
arity, or, for non-stationary series, to discover the
amount of differencing (the value of d, usually 1 or
2) required to produce stationarity, and to develop
an initial estimate of the order of the autoregressive
operator and of the moving average operator.
The basic time-series analysis permits categoriz-
ing the forty-seven states into four groups based on
the presence or absence of periodicity and station-
arity in their time series. Within this general struc-
ture, the states can then be grouped according to
the presence of autoregressive or moving average
operators or both.
The classification of the states according to this
structure is shown in Table 2. The states with
stationary time series are also expected to be those
with zero slopes in the regression analysis, reflecting
fluctuation, either periodic or aperiodic, around a
fixed mean.
A typical stationary aperiodic time series is rep-
resented by that of Pennsylvania in Figure 3. Three
of the four states in the stationary aperiodic group,
the northeastern states of Maine, New York, and




Non-Periodic Periodic Non-Periodic Pe
Period
State Slope State Slope Pers) State Slope d State Slope(years)
ME 0 NJ 0 9 NH - 1 VT -
NY 0 MD 0 19 MA - 2 GA +
PA 0 VA 0 21 RI - 1 FL -
WV - SD 0 .2:25 CT - I KY -
NB 0 ->25 , MI - I TN -
ID 0 ->25 MN - I AL -
UT 0 9 ND - I MS -
CA 0 a25 NC + 1 LA 0
OH - 24 SC + I MT -
IN - 21 TX + I NM -
IL - _>25 OK - I CO -
WI 0 24 AZ - I OR +
IA - 23 WY - 2
MO - 22 NV - 2
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Imprisonment Rate for Illinois
is also in that group, but its slope is significantly
negative statistically, probably because of a recent
change in its pattern.'
The largest single group of states is composed of
the sixteen states with periodic stationary time
series, as illustrated by Illinois in Figure 4. The
period is generally long, around nineteen to
twenty-five or more years'" for all states other than
New Jersey and Utah, which have a short period
of nine years. In nine of these sixteen cases, the
slopes of the regression lines are also zero. In the
"The regression analysis indicates that West Virginia
has a significant downward trend, whereas the time series
analysis shows it to be stationary. The imprisonment
level in West Virginia fluctuated around a steady value
for most of the time, and then decreased steadily after
1964. The time-series model puts less weight on that
recent trend and so indicates stationarity, whereas the
regression analysis fits a line with negative slope to the
data to minimize the squared error.
" Because the data covered only 49 years, periods
longer than 25 years could not be discerned. This period-
icity, approximating one generation, could be reflecting
generational cycles in birth rates.
other seven cases, however, the slopes in the regres-
sion analysis are different from zero, and the period
is long in all these cases. The stationarity found in
the time-series analysis indicates that this apparent
slope is an artifact resulting from the fact that the
second cycle of the nineteen to twenty-five year
process was only partially completed since the
trend line through that partial cycle generates a
slope that would presumably become zero when
the cycle is completed. The six states with negative
slope were all increasing their irmprisonment rates
in 1974, that is, returning to the stable level, thus
confirming the general effect. Arkansas, the one
state with a positive slope, appears to be on the
other part of its cycle, and thus can be expected to
decrease its imprisonment rate. These projections
are just the opposite of what would be reached by
the regression analysis alone, which would predict
continuation of the aggregate trend. Taking these
periodic projections into account, the time-series
analysis suggests stationarity in twenty of the forty-
seven states.
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FIGURE 5
time series all have non-zero slopes, again confirm-
ing the consistency between the time series and the
regression classifications? ° Arizona, as demon-
strated in Figure 5, represents a typical non-pe-
riodic non-stationary time series, and Tennessee, as
demonstrated in Figure 6, is a typical periodic one.
In nineteen of the twenty-seven states, a single
differencing (d = 1) is required to establish sta-
tionarity, suggesting a predominantly linear trend
in those states. This trend is negative in thirteen of
the states, positive in five, and is zero in Louisiana.
The other eight states require two differencings
(d = 2). These are the western states of Washing-
ton, Nevada, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and
2"The singular exception is Louisiana, which does
have a zero trend, but its time-series displays sharp and
short fluctuations, and so requires a single differencing to
produce stationarity. In this case, the single differencing
is required for smoothing rather than for removing a time
trend, a distinction noted by Fuller. W. FULLER, INTRo-
DucTION TO STATISTICAL TIME SERIES (1976). Thus, Louis-
iana could reasonably be considered one of the stationary
states.
New Mexico, and the New England states of Maine
and Vermont. These series are chaIacterized by
occasional steep trends in the time series.
The non-periodic non-stationary group of fifteen
states includes the three states with the compara-
tively highest positive slopes, i.e., North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Texas. All the other states in
this group have decreasing imprisonment rates,
and comprise three regional groupings: the New
England states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut; the midwestern
states of Michigan, Minnesota, and North Dakota;
and the western states of Oklahoma, Arizona, Wy-
oming, Nevada, and Washington.
The periodic non-stationary group includes a
large group of southern states: Kentucky, Tennes-
see, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and
Georgia. It also includes the western group of
Montana, New Mexico, Colorado, and Oregon, as
well as Vermont. Thus, nine of the eleven western
states, all save Utah and California, are non-sta-
tionary, and six of the eight states with d = 2, i.e.,
those with their imprisonment rates decreasing
I I ! ! I 1 I I I
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faster than linearly, are western states. This may
reflect the fact that their population has grown
faster than their prison capacity. This growth ac-
celerated after World War II, the later part of the
1926-1974 period studied. This change in trend
could account for the quadratic effect implied by
d = 2.
The classification of time-series patterns reveals
some striking regional consistency, as shown in the
map of Figure 7. The strongest pattern is reflected
in the ten midwestern states, Ohio, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas,
South Dakota, and Nebraska, which are stationary
periodic with long time periods. The nature of the
pattern is reflected in the time series of Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois, depicted together in Figure
8. The only other stationary periodic states are the
neighboring states of New Jersey, Maryland, and
Virginia and the western neighbors, Utah and
Idaho.
The second largest single group consists of six
southern states, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida. All six of these
states have non-stationary periodic time series with
decreasing trends. The time series for Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Louisiana are shown in Figure 9.
Georgia also falls in the same category; however, it
has increasing imprisonment rates, a characteristic
it shares with its neighbors South Carolina and
North Carolina, as well as with Texas and Oregon.
Thus, Georgia's shading reflects its membership in
both groups.
The stationary non-periodic states include only
the four northeastern states of Maine, New York,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. The New Eng-
land neighbors of New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut are all non-stationary non-
periodic, as are the three neighboring north-mid-
western states of Michigan, Minnesota, and North
Dakota.
FIGURE 6
Imprisonment Rate for Tennessee
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Northeastern Group (Stationary, Non-Periodic)
States with Increasing Trends ( Non-Stationary,
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Northeastern Group 1 (Stationary, Periodic)
FIGURE 7
Regional Groupicg
Table 3 classifies the states on the basis of the
ARIMA classification. Here, the states are first
partitioned, as before, on the basis of stationarity
and periodicity, and then according to an autore-
gressive component [AR or IAR, depending on
stationarity], to a moving-average component [MA
or IMA], to both autoregressive and moving-aver-
age components [ARMA or ARIMA], or to neither
[simply I].
The regional patterns are largely preserved in
this finer classification. The group of northeastern
states, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia, all have AR time series. The New Eng-
land states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island are all non-periodic ARIMA, while
Connecticut and Vermont are somewhat different.
Connecticut is simply an integrated series (I), and
Vermont is ARIMA but periodic.
The states in the largest group often midwestern
states divide into two groups of five. Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Iowa, and Arkansas have AR time series,
while Wisconsin, Missouri, South Dakota, Ne-
braska, and Kansas have ARMA time series.
Am~ng the seven southern states, Florida, Ken-
tucky, and Tennessee fall into the same ARIMA
group, while Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana
have integrated series. Mississippi has an annual
pattern of an IAR time series. The sense of regional
homogeneity is enhanced by noting first that when
regional groups are split into this finer classification
scheme, neighboring states continue to stay to-
gether, even in these finer subdivisions. Further-
more, when a state is distinguished from those
states whose patterns it shared in the prior analysis,
it tends to be classified like its neighbors. Thus,
Mississippi has an integrated time series like Geor-
gia, Alabama, and Louisiana, but also has an AR
component like Arkansas, another neighbor. Simi-
larly, North Carolina is separated from South Car-
olina and Texas, because it has an AR component,
while they are IMA. But in this classification it is
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FIGURE 8
Imprisonment Rates for3 Midwestem States
TABLE 3
ARIMA CLASSIFICATION OF STATES
Stationary Non-Stationary
Non-Pe- Periodic Non-Periodic Periodic
riodic
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time series and also similar to Kentucky and Ten-
nessee, which are ARIMA. On the other hand, we
note that Oklahoma has an IMA series, like Texas
and South Carolina.
North Dakota is also separated from the others
in its regional group, Michigan and Minnesota,
which are IMA, but Montana also has an IMA
series, which again suggests regional influences.
The scattered nature of the western states is again
confirmed, with no clear regional grouping arising
from this classification.
V. SUMMARY
In examining the trends in the per capita im-
prisonment rates in the forty-seven states, it has
been noted that almost half, twenty, are trendless,
i.e., stationary, and that the trends in the remainder
are small, i.e., less than 2% of the mean per year in
all cases. These findings are thus consistent with
the general homeostatic process previously ob-
served in the United States as a whole and in other
countries.21 Thus, a phenomenon previously ob-
served in three nations now appears to hold reason-
ably well across a wide variety of independent,
albeit related, jurisdictions.
In examining the time series of per capita im-
21 See Blumstein & Cohen, note 2 supra; Blumstein,
Cohen & Nagin, note 4 supra.
prisonment rates within the individual states, it has
been noted that all have experienced fluctuations
in the imprisonment rates to varying degrees, with
the coefficients of variation generally in the range
of 15 to 25%. In particular, these fluctuations have
been identifiably periodic in twenty-eight states,
suggesting the existence of forces drawing short-
term fluctuations in the imprisonment rate back to
the long-term stable level. Thus, deviations around
that level are much more appropriately viewed as
transient fluctuations than as a continuing diver-
gence. Where a trend does exist, it is much smaller
than the amplitude of the fluctuations, another
result that is consistent with the hypothesis ofstable
imprisonment rates.
The existence of regional similarities in the pat-
terns of imprisonment-rate time series also suggests
that the fluctuations are not simply random.
Groups of neighboring states are subjected to re-
lated socioeconomic and political forces, and these
could well exert a common regional influence on
the imprisonment decisions made in each state
within the region. The common influences could
include similar historical and social development,
cultural homogeneity, and related economic activ-
ity. The related patterns are most apparent and
widespread in the midwest and the south, the two
regions with perhaps more internal similarities
than any other. The consistency of these patterns
within the regions and the differences across the
regions suggest the need for further analysis to
identify the factors that influence .the imprison-
ment-rate patterns.
The analysis of the oscillatory patterns of the
imprisonment rates suggests that short-term projec-
tion into the future of a state's imprisonment rate
is much more likely to be reliably performed by
time-series analysis rather than by extrapolation of
a time trend, at least for the states with periodic
time series. In addition, it is important to incor-
porate into any such forecasts other factors such as
demographic or migration patterns. The time-se-
ries implicitly incorporates past influences of such
factors, but cannot be sensitive to future changes
that depart from the patterns that prevailed in the
past. If those future changes can be estimated
independently, then their effects can be incorpo-
rated explicitly.
One of the important areas for future investiga-
tion is the identification of the causes of the ob-
served variation in the mean imprisonment rate
across the states. Some of the variation may be a
result of differences among states in assigning pris-
1979]
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oners to state institutions,2 or in reporting the
imprisonment data.2a These artifactual differences
have to be accounted for before one can reasonably
identify the cultural or socioeconomic factors that
determine a state's imprisonment rate.
Further analysis would be required to identify
the adaptive mechanisms by which the homeostatic
level is maintained. During periods of declining
imprisonment rate, as the threshold of seriousness
warranting imprisonment is increased, one would
22 For example, some restrict state prisons to persons
with sentences of at least two years, while others may
have different rules.
2 For example, some states may include the popula-
tion of some local jails in their reported state prison
populations.
expect the average seriousness of the offenses of
committed offenders to be increasing. During pe-
riods of increasing imprisonment rate, the opposite
effects would be expected. During the periods of
increasing imprisonment rate, controlling for of-
fense and offender seriousness, one would also ex-
pect to see increases in the branching ratios reflect-
ing deeper penetration into the criminal justice
system or in time served in prison. The particular
decision stage or stages where that occurs, however,
will differ in different jurisdictions, depending on
the particular officials who exercise the primary
discretion.
Pursuit of these issues is desirable in order to
provide the theoretical and operational insights
necessary to understand the criminal justice system,
as well as to improve it.
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